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Abstract
Consider a multi−stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are
continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage.
They achieve this by showing that the subgame perfect equilibium path correspondence is
upper hemicontinuous. The present paper gives a short proof of existence that focuses on
equilibrium payoffs rather than paths.
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Games with inﬁnite choice sets are natural in many economic applications.
Nevertheless, existence of a suitable equilibrium is often a non-trivial issue. For
example, consider a game with a ﬁnite number of stages, in each of which players
move simultaneously with complete information on previous choices. Harris, Reny
and Robson (1995) give an example of such a game in which there is no subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) despite the compactness of choice sets at each stage and
the continuity of payoﬀs. On the other hand, existence of an SPE is guaranteed
if at each stage a publicly observed signal is added which permits individuals at
that stage to correlate over the set of equilibria in the continuation game.
In fact, Harris, Reny and Robson establish this result by showing that the SPE
path correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The present paper shows that, by
focussing on equilibrium payoﬀs rather than paths, a substantially shorter proof
of existence per se is available.
2. The Class of Games
A continuous stage game with public randomization is comprised of N players
playing simultaneously in each of T s t a g e s . W i t h i ne a c hs t a g ea f t e rt h eﬁrst,
Nature ﬁrst chooses a public signal drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,1],
independently of all previous choices and signals. All players are informed of this
signal as well as of all choices made in all previous stages. Players then make their
simultaneous choices at the given stage. Our notation is as follows.
Choices/strategies. The set of choices available to player i at every stage is
c o n t a i n e di naﬁxed compact metric space of choices, Ci. Let C ≡ ×N
i=1Ci. A
typical choice of player i at stage t is denoted ct
i, and the vector of stage t choices
(ct
1,...,ct
N) of the N players is denoted by ct. Nature’s stage t signal is denoted by
st ∈ [0,1], for t ≥ 2.
Player i’s compact metric space of possible stage 1 choices is denoted C1
i ⊆ Ci
and C1 ≡ ×N
i=1C1
i . For stages t =2 ,...,T, a history prior to t, denoted ht−1, is
av e c t o ro ft h ef o r mht−1 =( c1,s 2,c 2,...,s t−1,c t−1). The set of all such possible
histories prior to t is denoted by Ht−1. For each such stage t, let Ct
i(ht−1) denote
the set of possible choices available to player i given the history ht−1. Thus given
ht−1, the joint choice vector ct satisﬁes ct ∈ Ct
1(ht−1)×...×Ct
N(ht−1) ≡ Ct(ht−1) ⊆
C. It is assumed that Ct : Ht−1 ³ C is a continuous correspondence which is
independent of s2,...,st−1. For all t ≥ 2, it follows that Ht is a compact metric
space, as are the sets Ct(ht−1), for each ht−1.A strategy for player i is a T−tuple (α1
i,α2
i,...,αT
i ) such that
(i) α1
i ∈ ∆(C1
i ), 1 (ii) for all t ≥ 2, αt
i : Ht−1 ×[0,1] → ∆(Ci) is Borel measurable,
and (iii) for all t ≥ 2 and all (ht−1,s t) ∈ Ht−1 × [0,1], αt
i(Ct
i(ht−1)|ht−1,s t)=1 .
We refer to αt
i as player i’s stage t strategy.
Payoﬀs. Ui : HT → R++ is continuous and independent of (s2,...,s T) for every
i =1 ,...,N.2
O u ro b j e c t i v ei st op r o v et h ef o l l o w i n g .
Theorem 1. Every continuous stage game with public randomization possesses
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
3. Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We ﬁrst employ a backward induction program to generate a suitable pay-
oﬀ correspondence from which to select an SPE payoﬀ function. However, this
alone does not guarantee that the underlying strategies are measurable functions
of histories, and so also fails to ensure that a player can calculate the payoﬀ conse-
quences of an arbitrary deviation. The requisite measurablility is ensured through
an additional forward induction program.
The backward and forward programs. We ﬁrst sketch the backward induc-
tion program, which selects a set of continuation payoﬀs for each stage, beginning
with stage T. Fixing a stage t, suppose this program has so far generated, for
each history h prior to t, for each stage t signal of nature s, and for each stage
t choice vector c ∈ Ct(h), a set of stage t continuation payoﬀ vectors P(h,s,c).
Suppose further that this correspondence P is non-empty-valued, convex-valued
and upper hemicontinuous (u.h.c.). (These conditions on P hold for t = T since
P(h,s,c) is then {u(h,s,c)}.) For each such h and s, choose p ∈ S(P(h,s,·)), 3
and consider the set of NE in the game with pure strategies Ct(h) and payoﬀ
function p : Ct(h) → RN
++. Let Q(h,s) denote the set of NE payoﬀ vectors ob-
tained from all such measurable selections from P(h,s,·). Because Nature chooses
a public signal uniformly from [0,1] at the beginning of each stage, the expected
payoﬀ vector given h, just before Nature chooses the signal, belongs to the set R 1
0 Q(h,s)ds ≡ ¯ P(h). The backward inductive step is to show that ¯ P(h) is also
1∆(A) is the set of Borel probability measures on a compact metric space A, so that ∆(A)
is itself a compact metric space with the topology of weak convergence.
2Assuming payoﬀs are strictly positive facilitates, for instance, the proof of Lemma 6 in the
Appendix.
3If G(·) is any correspondence, then S(G(·)) is the set of measurable selections from G(·).
2non-empty-valued, convex-valued and u.h.c. and so can play in stage t − 1 the
role played by P in stage t.
Suppose the above backward induction program has been completed. Measur-
able strategies underlying these payoﬀs are then obtained by a forward induction
program beginning in stage 1 and ending in stage T,sketched as follows. Suppose,
at the beginning of stage t, that this program has constructed for each player i,
measurable stage 1 through stage t − 1 strategies that form an SPE in the t − 1
stage truncation of the game, and that the payoﬀ vector from each history h
∈ Ht−1 is ¯ p(h), for some ¯ p ∈ S( ¯ P(·)), where ¯ P(·) is the correspondence derived in
the backward program for the (t − 1)st stage game. The forward inductive step
is to show that there exists a measurable payoﬀ selection p : Ht → RN
++ from
P(·), the payoﬀ correspondence from the backward program for the tth stage,
such that ¯ p can be induced from p and measurable stage t strategies. That is,
that there exists a measurable function α : Ht−1 × [0,1] → ×N
i=1∆(Ci) such that




C p(h,s,c)dα(c|h,s)ds and α(·|h,s)
is an NE in the subgame (h,s) with the payoﬀ selection p(h,s,·). This inductive
step yields measurable stage 1 through stage t strategies constituting an SPE in
the t stage truncation of the original game with payoﬀ vector given by p.
To prove Theorem 1, it suﬃces then to show that a typical single step in both
the backward and forward induction programs can be performed.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . For simplicity, we avoid all explicit reference to the
particular stage game under consideration. The notation is otherwise as in the
above description of the backward and forward programs. Let F ≡ {(h,s,c) ∈
H×[0,1]×C : c ∈ C(h)}, where C(h) ≡ ×N
i=1Ci(h) ⊆ C. Thus F is the compact set
of feasible history-signal-choice triples up to the end of the stage game in question,
and the set of available choices given h, C(h), varies continuously with h ∈ H.
Let P : F ³ RN
++ and ¯ P : H ³ RN
++ be the payoﬀ correspondences deﬁned in
the description of the backward induction program.
Proposition 2. (Backward Inductive Step) Suppose that P is nonempty-valued,
convex-valued, u.h.c., and independent of all signals of Nature. Then ¯ P has these
properties as well.
Proof. Simon and Zame (1990) implies that for every (h,s) ∈ H × [0,1] there
exists a measurable selection from P(h,s,·) and an associated NE α ∈ ∆(C(h)).
Let Q(h,s) ⊆ RN
++ then denote the nonempty set of all Nash equilibrium payoﬀ
vectors that result from some such selection. Note that since P is independent of
s, so is Q.T h u sw ew r i t eQ(h) rather than Q(h,s). Since by deﬁnition, ¯ P(h)= R 1
0 Q(h)ds, it follows that ¯ P(h)=co Q(h), the convex hull of Q(h), for all h ∈ H.
3(See, for instance, Hildenbrand, 1974, p. 62.) Hence ¯ P is nonempty-valued and
convex-valued. Finally ¯ P must be shown to be u.h.c. This follows from the u.h.c.
of Q established in the Remark following the proof of Lemma 4.
Proposition 3. (Forward Inductive Step) Suppose that P : F ³ RN
++ is
nonempty-valued, convex-valued and u.h.c. and that P(h,s,c) is independent of
s for every h ∈ H and c ∈ C(h). Suppose that ¯ P : H ³ RN
++ is nonempty-valued,
convex-valued and u.h.c. Then for any ¯ p ∈ S( ¯ P(·)) there exists p ∈ S(P(·)) and a
measurable map α : H ×[0,1] → ×N
i=1∆(Ci) such that for all h ∈ H and s ∈ [0,1],







(iii) α(·|h,s) is an NE in the subgame (h,s) given the payoﬀ selection p(h,s,·).
Proof. We shall demonstrate the existence of measurable strategies, α, that are,
in addition, step functions of the current signal by Nature. Further, since payoﬀs
belong to RN
++, Carathéodory’s Theorem will imply that these step functions
require at most N +1distinct values.
Step 1. Fix an arbitrary ¯ s ∈ [0,1]. Deﬁne the correspondence Ψ : H ³ RN
++ ×
([0,1] × ∆(C) × M(C))N+1 as follows:4 (v,(sk,αk,µ k)N
k=0) ∈ Ψ(h) iﬀ,f o rk =
0,...,N,





C ˜ pk(h,c)dαk, for some ˜ pk(h,·) ∈ S(P(h, ¯ s,·)),
for all k =0 ,...,N,
(c) αk ∈ ×N
i=1∆(Ci(h)) is a NE in subgame (h, ¯ s) with payoﬀs ˜ pk(h,·),
(d) µk =˜ pkαk.
The notation in (d) above means that µk(A)=
R
A ˜ pk(h,c)dαk(c), for all A ∈
B(C(h)). (If D is any metric space, B(D) denotes its Borel σ-algebra.) Since ¯ P
is nonempty-valued, so too is Ψ. Lemma 4 in the Appendix deﬁnes a related
correspondence Φ : H ³ RN
++ × ∆(C) × M(C) and shows that Φ is u.h.c. That
Ψ is u.h.c. then follows.
Step 2. Let g : H ×RN
++ ×([0,1]×∆(C)×M(C))N+1 → RN
++ be the projection
map deﬁned by g(h,v,(sk,αk,µ k)N
k=0) ≡ v. Since by Step 1, Ψ is nonempty-
valued and u.h.c., it is compact-valued and measurable. Also, by deﬁnition of
¯ P and Ψ and by Carathéodory’s Theorem, ¯ p(h) ∈ g({h}×Ψ(h)) for all h ∈ H.
Consequently, by Lemma 5 in the Appendix, there exists ψ ∈ S(Ψ(·)) satisfying
¯ p(h)=g(h,ψ(h)) for all h. That is, there exist, for k =0 ,1,...,N, measurable maps
sk : H → [0,1],w h e r e0 ≡ s0(h) ≤ s1(h) ≤ ... ≤ sN(h) ≤ sN+1(h) ≡ 1, measurable
4Note that ×N
i=1∆(Ci(h)) ⊆ ∆(C). If M(C) is the set of positive bounded measures on any
compact metric space C, then ×N
i=1M(Ci) ⊆ M(C).
4maps αk : H → ×N
i=1∆(Ci), where αk(·|h) ∈ ×N
i=1∆(Ci(h)), and measurable maps





C ˜ pk(h,c)dαk(c|h), for some ˜ pk(h,·) ∈ S(P(h, ¯ s,·))
for all h ∈ H,
2. αk(·|h) is an NE in the subgame (h, ¯ s) given the payoﬀ selection ˜ pk(h,·),
3. µk(·|h)=˜ pk(h,·)αk(·|h).
Step 3. Although ˜ pk(·) need not be B(H ×C)-measurable, it can be replaced by
some pk(·) which is measurable. In the light of “1” and “3” from Step 2, Lemma
6 in the Appendix implies that for each k, there exists ˆ pk ∈ S(P(·, ¯ s,·)) such that
ˆ pk(h,c)=˜ pk(h,c) for αk(·|h)−a.e. c ∈ C(h), for k =0 ,...,N and all h ∈ H.
Consider now all choices for player i which, in the subgame determined by
(h, ¯ s), are better for i under ˆ pk
i than playing according to αk



















i (h) is measurable, for each h ∈ H. Further, given “2” of Step 2 and
the αk(·|h)−a.e. equality of ˆ pk(h,·) and ˜ pk(h,·), it follows that αk
i(Bk
i (h)|h)=0 .
Let ˇ pi ∈ S(P(·, ¯ s,·)) be a vector payoﬀ in RN





ˇ pi(h,c), if (h,ci) ∈ Gr(Bk
i ), but (h,cj) / ∈ Gr(Bk
j), ∀j 6= i
ˆ pk(h,c), otherwise.
It can be shown that Gr(Bk
l ), the graph of Bk
l , is a measurable subset of H×Cl, for
each player l.5 It follows that pk is B(H×C)-measurable. Hence, pk ∈ S(P(·, ¯ s,·)).
Moreover, since by construction, pk(h,·) agrees αk(·|h)−a.e. with ˜ pk(h,·), and i’s
expected payoﬀ under pk(h,·) from any available choice cannot exceed that under
˜ pk(h,·), αk(·|h) is an NE in the subgame (h, ¯ s) given the payoﬀ selection pk(h,·),
for all k =0 ,1,...,N,a n dh ∈ H.
Step 4. Finally, deﬁne p : F → RN
++ by p(h,s,c) ≡ pk(h,c) if sk(h) ≤ s<
sk+1(h); and deﬁne α : H × [0,1] → ×N
i=1∆(Ci) by α(·|h,s) ≡ αk(·|h) if sk(h) ≤
s<s k+1(h) where for k = N, the strict inequalities in both deﬁnitions are weak.
Since for every k the functions pk, αk, and sk are Borel measurable, so are
the functions p and α. Moreover, p(h,s,c) ∈ P(h,s,c) for all (h,s,c) ∈ F.T h i s
5Dubins and Freedman (1964, 2.2 and 3.1) imply that
R
C ˜ pk
i (h,c)dαk(c|h) is a Borel measur-
able function of h. Indeed, it follows that
R
C−i ˆ pk
i (h,¯ ci,c −i)dαk
−i(c−i|h) is also a Borel measurable
function of (¯ ci,h).
5is since, by Step 3, pk(h,c) ∈ P(h, ¯ s,c), for all h ∈ H and c ∈ C(h), and since
P(h,s,c) is independent of s. It follows that p ∈ S(P(·)).
By “1” and “2” of Step 2, p and α satisfy (i) and (ii). Finally, (iii) follows
from the conclusion of Step 3 and the fact that P(h,s,c) is independent of s.
4. Appendix
Lemma 4. (Simon and Zame 1990): Suppose that H, S and Ci,i=1 ,2,...,N are
compact metric spaces and that C ≡ ×N
i=1Ci. Let P : H×S×C ³ RN
++ be a u.h.c.,
convex-valued, and nonempty-valued payoﬀ correspondence, and C : H ³ C be a
continuous choice correspondence. It follows that: (i) For every (h,s) ∈ H × S,
there is a payoﬀ selection p(·) ∈ S(P(h,s,·)) such that the N−player game with
pure choice sets Ci(h) ⊆ Ci i =1 ,2,...,N and payoﬀ function p(·) possesses
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium; (ii) The correspondence Φ : H ³ RN
++ ×
∆(C) × M(C) deﬁned by (v,α,µ) ∈ Φ iﬀ
(b0) v =
R
C ˜ p(h,c)dα, for some ˜ p(h,·) ∈ S(P(h, ¯ s,·)),
(c0) α ∈ ×N
i=1∆(Ci(h) is an NE in the subgame (h, ¯ s) with payoﬀs ˜ p(h,·),
(d0) µ =˜ pα,
is u.h.c. (Here, ¯ s ∈ [0,1] is ﬁxed but arbitrary.)
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from Simon and Zame (1990) by noting that
for every (h,s) ∈ H × S, the correspondence P(h,s,·):C(h) ³ RN
++ satisﬁes
the conditions of Section 2 of their paper. Moreover, their Theorem proves (ii) as
well, reinterpreting the index on their sequence of ﬁnite approximations to players’
strategy sets as a sequence of h’s here. Their requirement that the sequence of
strategy sets yields a Hausdorﬀ approximation to the original strategy sets is
ensured here by continuity of the choice correspondence C(h) in h.6
Remark: It follows from (ii) that Q(·), as in the proof of Proposition 2, and Ψ(·),
as in Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 3, are u.h.c. correspondences.
For the remaining two results it is assumed that H and C are compact metric
spaces. This assumption is stronger than needed for the results quoted.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Ψ : H ³ RN × (R × ∆(C) × M(C))N+1 is a compact-
valued measurable correspondence (Wagner (1977, pp. 862-863)), g : Gr(Ψ) →
RN is a Carathéodory map (Wagner (1977, p. 863)). and ¯ p : H → RN is
measurable with ¯ p(h) ∈ g({h}×Ψ(h)), for all h ∈ H. Then there exists ψ ∈ S(Ψ)
such that ¯ p(h)=g(h,ψ(h)) for every h ∈ H.
6Continuity of the choice correspondence also ensures that the limit of a sequence of Nash
equilibrium distributions is feasible.
6Proof. See Wagner (1977, p. 876, Theorem 7.4 (iii).)
Lemma 6. Suppose that P : H × C ³ RN is nonempty-valued and u.h.c.
and the maps α : H → ∆(C) and µ : H → ∆(C) are Borel measurable. In
addition, suppose µ(A|h)=
R
A ˜ p(h,c)dα(c|h),f o ra l lA ∈ B(C), where ˜ p(h,·)
is for every h a B(C)−measurable selection from P(h,·). Then although ˜ p need
not be B(H × C)−measurable, there exists a selection ˆ p(·) from P(·) which is
measurable, such that µ(A|h)=
R
A ˆ p(h,c)dα(c|h),f o ra l lh ∈ H and all A ∈ B(C).
Thus ˆ p(h,c)=˜ p(h,c) for α(·|h)-a.e. c ∈ C, for each h ∈ H.
Proof. Since α and µ are Borel measurable functions, α(A|h) and µ(A|h) are
measurable functions of h for every ﬁxed Borel subset A of C. (See Dubins and
Freedman (1964, 2.2 and 3.1), for example.) Consequently, indexed by h, α(·|h)
and µ(·|h), after normalizing µ(·|h) ∈ M(C) to be a probability measure, are a
measurable family of probability measures. ( See Dellacherie and Meyer, 1978,
p. 20, II.13. Therefore, by Theorem V.58 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, p.
52), there exists a B(H × C)−measurable function p0 : H × C → RN such that
µ(A|h)=
R
A p0(h,c)dα(c|h),f o ra l lh ∈ H and all A ∈ B(C).L e t
E ≡ {(h,c):p
0(h,c) ∈ P(h,c)} = {(h,c):[ P(h,c) ∩ {p
0(h,c)}] 6= ∅}.
T h ec o r r e s p o n d e n c ei ns q u a r eb r a c k e t si sm e a s u r a b l e ,b e i n gt h ei n t e r s e c t i o no ft w o
measurable correspondences whose values are closed subsets of RN. (See Wagner,
1977, p. 863.) Consequently E is a measurable subset of H × C. Deﬁne
ˆ p(h,c)=
½
p0(h,c) if (h,c) ∈ E
m(h,c) otherwise
where m ∈ S(P) is arbitrary. It follows that ˆ p ∈ S(P). For every h ∈ H,
p0(h,c)=˜ p(h,c), for α(·|h)−a.e. c ∈ C. Recalling that ˜ p(h,·) ∈ S(P(h,·)), it









for all h ∈ H and all A ∈ B(C).
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